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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, economists have sought to uncover the more subtle channels through 
which trade protection influences competitive behavior. While protection imparts obvious short-
run advantages to domestic industries by raising import costs or limiting import quantities, 
Krishna (1989), Lommerud and Sørgard (2001), and others have shown that, in some cases 
protection can benefit foreign rivals as well. The underlying motif in these results is that the 
threat (or even imposition) of protection decreases competition, causing output and/or prices to 
shift towards monopoly levels. As a result, profits rise for foreign and domestic firms alike. This 
possibility has been of particular interest in the realm of antidumping (AD) legislation.  Prusa 
(1992), Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999), and Zanardi (2000) all note that because domestic 
firms can request protection should collusion break down, with AD there is a resulting increase in 
the set of collusive outcomes which potentially benefits all firms. One possible problem with this 
strategy arises when the foreign exporter is also a domestic producer, that is, when one or more of 
the firms is a multinational enterprise (MNE). Under WTO rules, the domestic industries must 
prove to trade authorities that existing AD orders are worthy of continuation.1 Because the MNE 
can work to stop the imposition of an AD duty after collusion breaks down, this reduces the 
viability of the domestic firms’ threat and decreases the commitment power afforded to the MNE 
from antidumping legislation.  
In this paper, we demonstrate that there exists an alternative use of AD legislation that 
can improve the MNE’s ability to commit and yields higher profits for all firms. Under this 
alternative, AD duties are imposed before collusion breaks down, that is, they are imposed even 
during the cooperative stage. This strategy is clearly more costly than those in which duties are 
                                                 
1 The US initiated its “sunset review” policy in July 1998. In the first two years of the policy, all orders 
implemented before 1995 were reviewed by the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the US International 
Trade Commission (ITC). WTO legislation requires the cancellation of AD orders five years from the date 
of implementation unless domestic industries can successfully argue that the removal of protection will 
lead to a return to unfair trading conditions. See section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 
1675(c)). 
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only imposed after collusion breaks down, since in the sustainable agreements studied by Prusa 
(1992) and others the duty is never imposed. However, since the evidence indicates that it is 
much more difficult to have existing duties removed than to have new duties imposed, this costly 
strategy can buy a greater punishment should the MNE deviate.2 Therefore, if the gain from 
commitment power exceeds the cost of the duty (which is mitigated in part by the MNE’s ability 
to tariff jump), then as seen in the earlier papers, this changes the set of collusive outcomes to 
include agreements that benefit all firms. To illustrate this possibility, we use a dynamic model in 
which a foreign MNE and a domestic firm engage in Cournot competition in the domestic market 
to illustrate how the set of self-enforcing collusive quantities changes with the introduction of AD 
duties, and how this in turn can increase the profits of both firms. 
One curious artifact of our alternative use of AD duties is that it requires the MNE’s 
subsidiary to seek protection from its own parent, both during the initial decision to impose AD 
duties and during the sunset reviews that renew existing AD duties. Failure by these subsidiaries 
to seek duties can ultimately undermine the drive for lasting protection for at least two reasons. 
First, in order for US trade authorities to even consider imposing dumping duties, at least one-
quarter of the domestic industry (in terms of output) must actually seek protection and no more 
than one-half of the domestic industry can protest the petition.3 Second, policy makers become 
increasingly hesitant about enacting legislation that harms employers of U.S. workers, even if 
they happen to be non-U.S. firms. 4 Therefore, imposing or maintaining protection is more 
tenuous if foreign subsidiaries or their parent firms react to dumping measures with sufficient 
opposition. In fact, we have found several cases in which U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms have 
                                                 
2 According to Lindsey and Ikenson (2002), approximately 61 percent of initial petitions that are ruled upon 
result in duties. Compare this with sunset reviews where the DOC and ITC ruled in favor of continuing 
duties in 98 percent and 72 percent of cases respectively. 
3 The ITC considers whether domestic producers are “related parties” of foreign subsidiaries and may 
choose to exclude these firms when it records testimony and analyzes the “domestic industry”.  In most 
cases, however, purely domestic firms do not argue for the exclusion of foreign subsidiaries, and the ITC 
rarely exercises its discretion to separate such subsidiaries when it considers the domestic industry. 
4 This was witnessed recently when a proposal was made by South Carolina legislators to bar French 
imports after France refused to cooperate with US war efforts in Iraq. When it was realized how many local 
workers were actually employed by French subsidiaries, the proposition was quickly dropped.  
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either actively sought duties or remained passive while purely domestic U.S. firms pursued 
protection. In the sunset review involving various antifriction bearings imports from Europe and 
Asia, many of the targeted foreign firms were affiliated with US producers. In the ball bearings 
industry, most or all targeted German, Italian, Japanese and Singaporean producers had U.S. 
affiliates. Ultimately, the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission 
decided to maintain dumping orders against six out eight foreign ball bearing industries, including 
Germany, Italy, France, Japan, Singapore and the U.K. Interestingly, orders against Sweden and 
Romania, which had fewer US affiliates, were cancelled. Similar conditions existed in the 
concrete roller bearings, taper roller bearings and spherical roller bearings industries, leading one 
ITC Commissioner to state that, “the [affiliated] parties account for a substantial portion of US 
sales in all four [bearings] industries.”5  
An equally relevant case involves the Japanese forklift industry, in which all targeted 
firms had established US subsidiaries prior to the sunset review. Significantly, no attempts were 
made on the part of these subsidiaries to have the order cancelled.6 It is important to note that 
since these firms already had subsidiaries in place, the “protection-building trade” story of 
Blonigen and Ohno (1997) is not applicable. In that paper, they analyze a phenomenon in which a 
foreign firm chooses to increase the likelihood that trade barriers will be erected against its own 
industry. The authors show that this can be an optimal strategy if the firm can then shift 
production to the protected country and tariff jump which gives it an edge over competing foreign 
firms that are unable to engage in FDI. In particular, this strategy relies on asymmetries between 
firms since if firms are identical, either all or none will tariff jump, implying no gain from 
seeking protection. However, in the Japanese forklift case, all foreign firms tariff jumped, 
implying comparable costs. As a second example, consider the market for Anhydrous Sodium 
                                                 
5 See ITC Publication No. 3309 at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/reports/opinions/PUB3309.PDF, which discusses 
sunset review determinations regarding certain bearings from China, France, Germany, Hungary, Great 
Britain, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore and Sweden. 
6 See USITC publication No. 3287 at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/reports/opinions/PUB3287. 
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Metasilicate, in which the sole French producer, Rhodia, was affiliated with U.S. producer 
Crosfield. Despite the non-existence of additional French competitors, neither Crosfield nor 
Rhodia made an attempt to have the order cancelled.7 The likelihood of collusion between the two 
was even noted by Commissioner Askey, who in her dissenting opinion to revoke the order wrote 
that due to the affiliation between Rhodia and Crosfield “it therefore seems unlikely that Rhodia 
will begin importing large quantities of ASM, selling them in direct competition with Crosfield’s 
product.” As such, the protection-building trade story cannot always explain the continued 
support for AD duties.8 
In Section 2, we review the existing literature on AD and collusion, noting the difficulties 
of extending that work to a setting with significant multinational investment. Our model is 
presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Antidumping and Collusion 
We are not the first paper to recognize that AD legislation, now the most widely used 
form of protection in the U.S., can increase the likelihood of international collusion. Staiger and 
Wolak (1992) present a model in which a competitive domestic industry fights the periodic flow 
of imports from a foreign monopolist by petitioning for dumping protection. The authors solve 
for conditions under which the foreign monopolist agrees not to export its excess production in 
exchange for commitment by domestic industry not to file dumping charges. Prusa (1992) sees 
evidence of collusion in the fact that withdrawn antidumping cases lead to an almost equal 
reduction of imports as those cases in which duties are implemented. Moreover, Prusa points to a 
legal doctrine known as Noerr-Pennington, which facilitates collusive behavior by exempting 
firms from antitrust charges. The author develops a model of oligopolistic price competition in 
                                                 
7 See USITC Publication No. 3235 at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/reports/opinions/PUB3235.PDF. 
8 We recognize that despite the ability of Japanese forklift producers to avoid duties by shifting production 
to their US subsidiaries, protection continues to be a drawback by hindering production flexibility. Our 
theory is that the gain from collusion facilitated by the presence of antidumping protection can outweigh 
the costs brought on by a loss of production flexibility or the imposition of duties. 
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which foreign and domestic firms can always find a settlement that increases the profits of all 
firms involved.  Unlike our model, Prusa (1992) does not consider the payoff in a deviation phase 
in which one firm surprises the other, but instead simply compares the settlement payoff to the 
expected payoff if the case moves forward.9 Furthermore, neither of these papers suggests that 
AD duties will be used in equilibrium. In a model similar to Prusa’s, Zanardi (2000) does find 
that AD may be used, depending on the cost of coordination and the relative bargaining strength 
of the two firms. However, again, he finds that the imposition of duties represents a failure of the 
collusive process.  
 Using a slightly different approach, Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) investigate the 
effect of AD legislation on collusion between two domestic firms as well as between the foreign 
exporter and the domestic producers. Using simulation results, they find that depending on the 
degree of product heterogeneity and cost asymmetry between foreign and domestic firms, 
introducing AD can lead to a full cartel between all three firms, cooperation only between 
domestic firms, or straight competition. However, they do not consider a dynamic model with 
self-enforcing agreements, but instead only show how trade policy affects firm preferences over 
collusive structures. Furthermore, none of these papers consider the role of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). While the gain from introducing duties in our model can still hold if the foreign 
firm is a pure exporter, this market structure also makes it easier to get duties imposed after a 
deviation, making that a less-costly method of achieving a comparable degree of commitment 
power. Finally, all of these papers model price competition, indicating that our model’s second 
contribution is to confirm that the collusive power of AD legislation does not require Bertrand 
competition. 
 In addition to the work on AD legislation, other authors have analyzed the profit-
enhancing effects of trade policy for foreign and domestic firms. Krishna (1989) shows that under 
                                                 
9 An empirical study by Taylor (2001) fails to find evidence that withdrawn cases are a sign of collusion 
between foreign and domestic firms. 
 6
static duopolistic price competition, a quota enables foreign and domestic firms to circumvent the 
prisoner’s dilemma result and achieve economic profits.10 Under duty restrictions, however, 
Krishna’s model only allows the domestic producer to experiences a rise in profits. Lommerud 
and Sørgard (2001) study two firms that collude by not exporting to one another’s markets. They 
find that a reduction in trade barriers increases the gain from deviation and the punishment of 
reverting to the Nash equilibrium. For their functional forms, the first effect dominates for 
quantity competition, reducing the set of discount factors that sustain collusion, whereas the 
second effect dominates for price competition, increasing this set of discount factors. Two key 
factors differentiate their results from ours. First, they do not consider collusive outcomes other 
than abstention from exporting, indicating that trade costs are not paid during the cooperative 
phase. Second, both firms in Lommerud and Sørgard (2001) face trade costs when collusion 
breaks down, whereas only the foreign firm ever endures trade costs in our model.  
 Bulow, Geanakopolos and Klemper (1985) present a simple case in which a positive 
demand shock can ultimately lead to an overall decline in profits. In their model, one firm 
services two markets while a second firm competes with the first in only one market. When there 
is a positive demand shock in the monopoly market, firm 1 reallocates is sales away from the 
duopoly market. Firm 2 responds by increasing its sales in the duopoly market,  which would then 
lead to an increase in sales by firm B. If this response is sufficiently aggressive, which requires 
asymmetries between firms, then the increase in firm 1's profits from the positive shock in the 
first market are overwhelmed by the decline in its profits from the second market. Translating this 
result to our model suggests that it is possible that a reduction in protection applied by the MNE’s 
home country could also result in a decline in its profits as it increases imports from its 
subsidiary, although we do not address this possibility here. Finally, we note that the decision of a 
multinational to face protective barriers is analogous to the well-analyzed case of a monopolist 
                                                 
10 Thus, while we consider how implementation of a tariff affects the set of collusive outcomes, she 
investigates how trade protection affects the Nash equilibrium.  
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that chooses an otherwise non-optimal capacity level in order to deter entry ((seminal papers 
include Spence (1977), Dixit (1979) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983)).  
 
3. The Model 
 Our goal is to present a simple model that demonstrates that introducing an antidumping 
duty that binds even under cooperation can be profitable for the importing firm. Consider a 
setting with two firms, 1 and 2. Firm 1 is wholly domestic and produces a quantity q1 at a total 
cost 1( )qβ .
11 Firm 2 is a multinational firm that produces overseas and domestically. Its domestic 
production is q2 which comes at cost 2( )qγ . Firm 2’s overseas production is 
*
2q  which is 
produced and imported at a cost * *2 2( )q qφ τ+  where τ is the per-unit antidumping duty. Similar but 
more complicated results are found when using an ad-valorem duty. Define firm 2’s total quantity 
as *2 2 2Q q q= + . All three cost functions are increasing, convex functions of their respective 
quantities, although our results only require that there is a cost to firm 2 to shifting production 
from abroad to its domestic subsidiary. Since anti-dumping duties are applied to narrowly defined 
product categories, we assume that all of these products are homogeneous and sell in the domestic 
market at the price *1 2 2( )P q q q+ +  which is decreasing in the total quantity sold. As in most of the 
antidumping literature, we assume that all production is sold in the domestic market, although this 
could be relaxed without changing the underlying intuition of our results. Firms maximize the 
present discounted value of profits where profits in period t are: 
 *1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1,( ) ( )t t t t t tP q q q q qπ β= + + −  (1) 
and 
 * * * *2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2,( )( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t tP q q q q q q q qπ γ φ τ= + + + − − − . (2) 
                                                 
11 If firm 1 is also a multinational and the duty applies to it as well, the effects of an anti-dumping duty are 
more ambiguous since for each firm a rise in τ both loosens its incentive compatibility constraint as per 
firm 2 since deviations are less profitable and tightens it as per firm 1 since its opponent is now hampered if 
it deviates from the agreement. However, since the basic intuition remains the same, we use this simpler 
framework to outline the collusive effects of duties. 
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The first order conditions of these object functions are (suppressing time subscripts): 
 
1 1 1 12 2 2 2 2 2
( ( ) )) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ( )) 0B B B BP q Q Q q Q P q Q Q q Qβ′ ′+ + + − =  (3) 
 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0
B B B BP q Q q Q q P q Q q q qγ′ ′+ + + − =  (4) 
and 
 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0
B B B BP q Q q Q q P q Q q q qφ τ′ ′+ + + − − =  (5) 
where the superscript B denotes the best response given the other firm’s quantity. We assume that 
the best responses 1 2( )
Bq Q  and 2 1( )
BQ q are downward sloping, and that there is a unique pure 
strategy stable Nash equilibrium.12 We also assume that profit functions are quasi-concave in 
each firm’s own quantities, leading to convex level sets for iso-profits. 
 If there is no collusive agreement, the Cournot Nash equilibrium results in quantities 1
Nq , 
2
Nq , and *2
Nq  which translate into per-period profits 1
Nπ and 2
Nπ .13 These are derived from 
simultaneously solving (4), (5), and (6). Naturally, firms can increase profits through collusion. 
Denote the collusive quantities 1
Cq , 2
Cq , and *2
Cq  which correspond to per-period profits 1
Cπ and 
2
Cπ . With the above assumptions on profit functions, for both firms to gain from collusion each 
firm’s total collusive output must be less than its Nash output. In addition to this self-rationality, 
the set of collusive agreements is also constrained by incentive compatibility, i.e. neither firm can 
profit from deviating and suffering the consequences. We assume that firms follow grim trigger 
strategies, that is, after a deviation they revert to Nash behavior forevermore. In the deviation 
period, the deviating firm switches to deviation quantities, either 
21 1
( )D B Cq q Q=  or 2
Dq  and *2
Dq  
where *2 2 2 1( )
D D B Cq q Q q+ = , while the surprise firm continues to produce its cooperative quantity. 
                                                 
12 Chapter 5 of Tirole (1994) provides sufficient conditions for a unique, stable Nash equilibrium with 
quantity competition. 
13 The majority of papers on antidumping and collusion, including Prusa (1992) and Staiger and Wolak 
(1992), study Bertrand competition. Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) is an exception, however they 
do not examine the effect of duties on the set of sustainable collusive outcomes as we do. Thus, in addition 
to the paper’s contributions regarding the effect of antidumping legislation in the presence of a 
multinational, our paper demonstrates that the wisdom regarding collusion in prices carries over to 
collusion in quantities. 
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Since best responses are downward sloping, these deviation quantities exceed both the Nash and 
cooperative quantities. Denote the deviation period payoff to the cheating firm i by Diπ . By 
definition of the best response and self-rationality, 1 1 1
D C Nπ π π≥ ≥ and 2 2 2
D C Nπ π π≥ ≥  with 
equality only when firms collude at the Nash equilibrium. When the common discount rate is δ, 
incentive compatibility for firms 1 and 2 are given by: 
 1 1 1(1 )
C D Nπ δ π δπ≥ − +  (6) 
and 
 2 2 2(1 )
C D Nπ δ π δπ≥ − + . (7) 
Note that these imply that any incentive compatible agreement is also self-rational. Thus, for 
1δ <  these constraints lie inside the respective firm’s Nash equilibrium iso-profits with the 
exception of the Nash equilibrium itself, in which case they meet. This is illustrated by the IC 
curves in Figure 1. The contract curve denotes the set of quantities that translate to tangent iso-
profits, i.e. the quantities for which, to increase one firm’s profits it is necessary to reduce the 
other’s profit. Under the standard Folk theorems, for a high enough δ, a portion of the contract 
curve may be incentive compatible.14 For the moment, we assume that this is not the case, as 
illustrated by the CC line in Figure 1. We return to the alternative below. Note that the shape of 
the curves in Figure 1 are only intended to be illustrative; we do not require linearity of best 
responses or this particular shape of the contract curve. 
 When the contract curve lies outside the set of incentive compatible agreements, it seems 
reasonable to assume that any collusive agreement is going to involve at least one firm’s 
incentive compatibility constraint binding since it is possible to move to one of these curves and 
improve at least one firm’s profits without hurting the other. Thus, we restrict our attention to 
what happens when at least one firm’s constraint binds. Although further gains are feasible, 
movement in this direction creates too great a temptation for the firm whose constraint binds to 
                                                 
14 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1993) for details. 
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flood the market, capture a large one-period gain, and then revert to Nash behavior. If it were 
possible for this firm to gain some commitment power to not do so, then it could enjoy higher 
profits. The essence of our argument is that imposing a duty on firm 2’s imports acts as just such 
a commitment device, although a costly one. Thus, if it is firm 2’s incentive compatibility 
constraint that binds, then if imposition of the duty creates enough commitment power relative to 
its cost, then it is possible to impose a duty against its imports *2q  yet increase its profits. We now 
examine under what conditions this possibility exists. 
 Suppose that a small tariff is added to imports. By (4) and (5), for a given q1, firm 2 
imports decrease while its domestic production increases. Since its marginal costs are increasing, 
this substitution is not perfect and firm 2’s total quantity falls.15 Thus, firm 2’s best response 
curve moves inward. If (0) 0γ ′ = , this movement is a pivot about the q1 that originally drove firm 














< < . (9) 
Note that since the multinational firm can reallocate production to avoid the tariff that its profits 
are a decreasing at a decreasing rate in the tariff. If the marginal cost of overseas of production is 
also increasing, then these changes are larger in the deviation phase than at the Nash equilibrium 
since 
22
D NQ Q> . Since the purely domestic firm 1 does not pay the tariff, the only effect on its 
behavior is through the effect on Q2. Since quantities are strategic substitutes, this implies that: 
                                                 
15 Even if the domestic marginal cost is constant, as long as it exceeds the marginal cost of importing 
inclusive of the duty, 
2 1





> . (10) 
By (8) and (10), this implies that for a given 
2
CQ , the present discounted value of deviation rises 
for firm 1 tightening its incentive compatibility constraint. This shift is shown in Figure 2 by the 
movement of IC1 from its dashed to its solid position. A similar result would be found in Prusa 
(1992) or Staiger and Wolak (1992) because the duty gives their domestic firms an edge. The 
primary difference is that this effect is smaller in our case since firm 2’s ability to substitute 
domestic production for imports leads to a smaller decrease in Q2 than would be found for a pure 
importer. 
 Using (8) through (10) implies that for a given 1
Cq  the value of deviation is falling for 
firm 2. While this seems to suggest that introducing antidumping legislation relaxes 2’s incentive 
compatibility constraint, it is necessary to remember that this also reduces 2’s payoff to collusion 
(assuming of course that it is importing without the duty). When (3) holds with equality, holding 
cooperative quantities constant and taking the derivative of (3) with respect to the tariff yields: 
 
2 2
* * * * 1
2 2 2 2 1(1 )( ) ( ) '( ) 0
N




− − + − − + >  (11) 
since both the deviation and Nash equilibria involve higher production levels than the cooperative 
outcome.16 Thus, by (11), the multinational firm 2’s incentive compatibility constraint is loosened 
when the duty is imposed. This is represented in Figure 2 by the shift in IC2 from its dashed to its 
solid position.  
 Because the duty relaxes firm 2’s incentive compatibility constraint, if in the initial 
collusive agreement firm 1’s incentive compatibility constraint was non-binding, then there exists 
a set of quantities that are incentive compatible with antidumping legislation that were not so 
before. Some of these quantities yield a higher cooperative profit for firm 1. For example, for the 
                                                 
16 Note that derivation of this makes use of the envelope theorem with respect to deviation and Nash 
quantities. 
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firm 1 iso-profit illustrated in Figure 2, only one set of outputs was both self-enforcing and 
sufficient to reach this profit without the tariff, whereas the tariff creates a set of such quantities. 
Furthermore there are quantities to the south-east of this iso-profit that are self-enforcing and 
yield higher firm 1 profits.  
 In addition, some of these quantities also lie on higher initial iso-profits for firm 2 than 
the initial iso-profit. Because of this, it is tempting to assume that, as in Prusa (1992) or Staiger 
and Wolak (1992), this implies that introducing antidumping legislation will increase firm 2 
profits as well. However, this is not always the case. In their model, duties were only paid in the 
punishment (Nash) phase. In our model, however, these duties are also paid in the cooperative 
and deviation phases. Because of this, not only do the incentive compatibility curves shift, but 
firm 2’s cooperative iso-profits also move. It is therefore necessary to compare the gains from 
reducing firm 2’s incentive to deviate with the cost of that commitment power. To do this, 
imagine a central planner who maximizes firm 2’s cooperative profits subject to (7) and: 
 1 1
Cπ π≥  (12) 
that, is the central planner maximizes firm 2’s profits while keep firm 1 at least indifferent and 
minding firm 2’s incentive to deviate. At her disposal, she has all three cooperative quantities and 
a tariff. The first order condition to her maximization problem with respect to τ is: 
 ( )( ) ( ) 2 2* * * * * 12 2 2 2 2 2 11 ( )
N
C D C N C N N N dqq q q q q P q Q Q
d
λ δ δ δ
τ
 
′− + − − + − − + 
 
 (13) 
where λ2 is the Lagrange multiplier for firm 2’s incentive compatibility constraint. The first term 
is negative and represents the reduction in profits as the tariff rises. The second term is positive as 
per (11) above. Whether the cost of the duty is outweighed by the shadow value of the 
commitment afforded by the tariff is in general ambiguous. 
 Naturally, the cost in equation (13) is increasing as more is imported. Thus, the likelihood 
of a profit-increasing antidumping duty is decreasing in the absolute level of cooperative imports. 
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Because of this, if firm 2’s incentive compatibility constraint is non-binding and 2 0λ = , there is 
no benefit to the tariff. When firm 2’s constraint does bind, the benefit of the tariff is increasing in 
the shadow value of commitment. It is also increasing in the difference between the marginal 
effect of the tariff on profits in the deviation phase relative to cooperation (the first term in 
brackets) and in the difference between the marginal effect of the tariff on profits in the Nash 
equilibrium relative to cooperation (the final two terms). These effects are weighted by their 
relative importance in present discounted profits, hence the δ multiplier. As imports become more 
important in non-cooperative periods relative to the cooperative period, then profits in these 
periods decrease a great deal relative to cooperation, creating a large increase in the multinational 
firm’s commitment power. This is likely to happen when the domestic cost function is very 
convex relative to the overseas production function since this implies that domestic production is 
a small share of firm 2’s total output. The final term represents a second effect that reduces 2’s 
profits in the Nash equilibrium, since the duty gives firm 1 a competitive edge in the Nash 
equilibrium. The steeper the demand curve and the more responsive 1’s best response is, the 
greater this effect. Finally, as the discount rate δ rises, the effect of the tariff on the Nash payoffs 
becomes more important relative to its effect on the deviation period. Thus, as δ rises, 
commitment depends less on the one time gain from deviation and more on the losses under the 
Nash equilibrium, elevating their importance in sustaining collusion. 
 Thus, introducing an antidumping duty moves the frontier of incentive compatible 
profits. Figure 3 illustrates the profit possibilities frontier (the PPF line), which is directly related 
to the contract curve. Introducing a small duty pivots this in from the dashed to the solid line 
since it does not affect firm 1’s monopoly profits but reduces firm 2’s monopoly profits. Figure 3 
also shows the movement in the set of self-enforcing profits. Since we assumed the contract curve 
was outside of this lens, this set lies in the interior of the frontier. When the duty is introduced, 
the Nash equilibrium moves from A to B and the set of self-enforcing profits moves. If the gain to 
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commitment is sufficiently large as detailed above, this movement is such that both firms can 
gain from introduction of the duty. Note that this gain is relative to one without any duty, either 
with or without collusion. If the multinationality of firm 2 makes reduces the probability of a 
tariff being imposed in the deviation period to zero, then this implies that our strategy dominates 
those of Prusa (1992) or Staiger and Wolak (1992). If the probability that the duty can be 
enforced following deviation is less than one, then the relative merits of these two uses of AD 
duties is ambiguous. The reason is that in ours, although the higher probability of duty imposition 
and the imposition of duties during the deviation period lead to greater reductions in the present 
discounted value to deviation, unlike their strategy this comes at a cost.   
 As in their models, our analysis does not say that one of these new collusive outcomes 
will actually occur. This depends on the equilibrium selection method imposed, such as the Nash 
bargaining solution (Nash, 1953). However, when new collusive agreements become possible in 
Figure 3, it is certainly feasible that this will work to the benefit of firm 2. Furthermore, 
depending on the equilibrium selection method, it is possible for firm 2 to gain even when the 
change illustrated in Figure 3 does not occur. Since selection rules can depend on the set of 
equilibria, altering the set of self-enforcing agreements can shift favor to firm 2, benefiting it even 
at a cost to firm 1. This possibility is especially intriguing since the multinational firm 2 can file 
for protection against itself even if firm 1 does not participate. Finally, because the duty shifts the 
set of collusive outcomes, again depending on the selection rule, this can work to the benefit of 
firm 2 even if firm 1’s incentive compatibility constraint binds or a portion of the contract curve 
is self-enforcing. 
 Finally, note that the above analysis does not require FDI prior to the imposition of AD 
duties since the optimal value of 2q  may well be zero when 0τ = . Additionally, an interesting 
scenario arises when there are fixed costs associated with investment. Prior to undertaking 
investment, the change in profits from imposing an AD duty and then engaging in FDI is: 
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where ξ is the fixed cost of FDI. If FDI has already happened, then the change in profits is again 
(13), where of course the values of 1q  and 2Q  may differ from (14). It is certainly possible that 
although (14) is negative, the corresponding (13) is positive. As such, an initially pure foreign 
exporter may prefer to fight AD duties, but after losing this fight, will undertake FDI and prefer 




In our paper, we show that even when the threat of antidumping duties is small due to the 
presence of a multinational, AD legislation can still be used to support profitable collusive 
outcomes. In particular, this offers an explanation for why certain U.S. subsidiaries pursue 
antidumping protection from the foreign industries containing their own parent firms. We use a 
dynamic game in quantities with trigger strategies to show that duties can loosen the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the foreign firm and allow collusive agreements to arise that were 
previously unsustainable. We note that our results work best if collusion under free trade is 
established such that the incentive compatibility constraint binds for the foreign but not the 
domestic firm. In order for duties to shift the set of collusive arrangements into mutually 
beneficial territory with initial constraints binding for all parties, costs must be borne by both 
foreign and domestic producers. Of course, when a market is truly global and no purely domestic 
firms remain, this very scenario can arise (i.e. protection is levied against foreign multinationals 
whose subsidiaries compose the entire domestic market). The ball bearing industry has almost 
reached this stage and other industries could follow suit in the not-too-distant future.  
 Overall, we find it perplexing that trade authorities allow foreign multinationals to 
potentially abuse U.S. antidumping law in this manner. Since it seems clear that it is not rational 
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for a multinational firm to injure itself through dumping, we find it surprising that subsidiaries are 
allowed to lobby for antidumping protection. Certain trade authorities are similarly puzzled.17 On 
several occasions, particularly during the sunset review process, ITC commissioners have 
expressed doubt that multinationals would actually choose to threaten their US affiliates by 
dumping. In the sunset review involving sorbitol from France, Roquette America supported the 
continuation of duties against its parent, Roquette Freres. Additional support for the order came 
from US producer SPI, which had recently established a joint venture with French producer 
Amylum to produce sorbitol in France. A minority of ITC commissioners voted to cancel the 
order, declaring that “despite their affiliations, both Roquette America and SPI support 
continuation of the dumping order.” The majority of commissioners, however, voted to continue 
the antidumping order against imports of French sorbitol. Perhaps the decision to maintain some 
of these orders is an indication of the political muscle currently wielded by foreign 
multinationals. Nevertheless, if the benefits of increased US subsidiary production are substantial 
enough, these protective orders may serve as a symbiotic mechanism that increases US welfare as 
well as foreign multinational profits. 
                                                 
17 See USITC Publication 3165 at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/reports/opinions/PUB3165.PDF. 
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Figure 2 
 
Q2=q2+q2
*
q1
q1(Q2)
Q2(q1)
IC1
IC2
Q2Nash
q1Nash
Π2
C
Π1
C
IC2'
Q2(q1)'
 
 20
Figure 3 
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